Denmark
Country score (EU Average*)
Country Facts
| Income | High |
| GNI per capita (2021 PPP $) | 71202.22063 |
| Population, total | 5976992 |
| Urban population (% of total) | 88.70 |
| Internet users (per 100 people) | 99.77 |
| Life expectancy at birth (years) | 82.25 |
| Mean years of schooling (years) | 13.00 |
Sources:
World Bank,
UNDP,
Political Financing
The Grants to Political Parties Act (2006) and Parliamentary Election Act of Denmark (2009) are the main laws regulating the funding of political parties in Denmark.
The laws appear to impose little or no limits on the income of political parties. Donations from foreign entities, corporations, trade unions and anonymous donors are permitted. There appear to be no limits on the amount of money a party can accept.
There are provisions for the public funding of political parties and candidates. Funding is allocated to parties that have participated in the most recently held general election. Parties may use this funding to support their political work. Candidates can receive grants based on the number of votes received. All parties are given equal time broadcasting time which is provided free of charge.
For regulations on spending, vote buying is banned but there appear to be no limits on spending.
Parties are required to publish accounts which in some cases require the identity of a donor to be revealed (depending on the amount donated). Reports are submitted to the Minister for the Interior and Health and are also overseen by the Auditor General. Sanctions for breaches of the law include fines and imprisonment.
The laws appear to impose little or no limits on the income of political parties. Donations from foreign entities, corporations, trade unions and anonymous donors are permitted. There appear to be no limits on the amount of money a party can accept.
There are provisions for the public funding of political parties and candidates. Funding is allocated to parties that have participated in the most recently held general election. Parties may use this funding to support their political work. Candidates can receive grants based on the number of votes received. All parties are given equal time broadcasting time which is provided free of charge.
For regulations on spending, vote buying is banned but there appear to be no limits on spending.
Parties are required to publish accounts which in some cases require the identity of a donor to be revealed (depending on the amount donated). Reports are submitted to the Minister for the Interior and Health and are also overseen by the Auditor General. Sanctions for breaches of the law include fines and imprisonment.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bans and limits on private income | 39 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 56 | 0 | |
| Public funding | 50 | 50 | 50 | 38 | 62 | 50 | |
| Regulations on spending | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 25 | |
| Reporting, oversight and sanctions | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 92 | 75 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Legislation
| Grants to Political Parties Law No. 1291 of 8 December 2006 (English) | |
| Radio and Television Broadcasting Law No. 477 of 06 May 2010 (English) | |
| Criminal Code (2005, as amended in 2015) (English) | |
| Private Contribution to Political Parties and Publication of the Accounts of Political Parties 2006 (Danish) |
Financial Disclosure
No public official in Denmark is obliged to make any financial disclosure statements. For Ministers and Members of Parliament, however, a voluntary mechanism for disclosing public or private interests exists. Members of the government would publish these declarations on the webpage of the Prime Minister, and Members of Parliament follow the guidelines set down by their party. No such rules exist for Civil Servants. The Code of Conduct for public officials (2007) makes no references to financial disclosure.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Disclosure items | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 65 | 4 | |
| Filing frequency | 38 | 38 | 38 | 56 | 56 | 12 | |
| Sanctions | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 8 | |
| Monitoring and Oversight | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 75 | 6 | |
| Public access to declarations | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 56 | 12 | |
Alternative Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
| Head of State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Ministers | 82 | 82 | 82 | 87 | 87 | 87 | |
| Members of Parliament | 83 | 83 | 83 | 88 | 88 | 88 | |
| Civil servants | 82 | 82 | 82 | 87 | 87 | 87 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Conflict of Interest
There are no regulations governing conflicts of interests for the Prime Minister, Ministers or Members of Parliament. The Civil Servants’ Act (2004, last amended 2016) does not allow for Civil Servants to pursue a second occupation if this would constitute a conflict of interests. The Finance Minister gives guidance on this matter. No other regulations exist.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Restrictions | 35 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 45 | 15 | |
| Sanctions | 25 | 25 | 25 | 25 | 33 | 8 | |
| Monitoring and Oversight | 38 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 50 | 25 | |
Alternative Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
| Head of State | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Ministers | 44 | 64 | 64 | 64 | 51 | 79 | |
| Members of Parliament | 38 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 52 | 66 | |
| Civil servants | 48 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 68 | 68 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Legislation
| Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark of 1953 (Danish) | |
| Law on Civil Servants of 2017 (Danish) | |
| Public Administration Act of 2014 (Danish) | |
| Folketingets Forretningsorden | missing file: |
| Lov nr. 103/2021 om god adfćrd i det offentlige (Ministerial Code of Conduct Act) | missing file: |
| Lov om disciplinćransvar for tjenestemćnd (2022) | missing file: |
Freedom of Information
Denmark’s access to information regime is established by the Open Government Act No. 606 (2013). All activity exercised by the public administration is covered, but the law only mentions administrative documents. The law also applies to non-listed companies for which more than 75% of the shares are held by the public authorities and companies which are empowered to take decisions on behalf of a public authority.
Specific exemptions to disclosure are outlined in the aforementioned FOI law, the Criminal Code (2005), and the Act on Processing of Personal Data No. 429 (2000). No public interest test exists whereby exemptions to disclosure may be overridden in cases where disclosure of information benefits the public interest.
Appeals may be filed with public authorities and with the courts. There is no appeals process through an independent non-judicial mechanism, such as an information commissioner. The Ombudsman’s decisions are non-binding.
There are no sanctions specified in the law for violations of FOI provisions, nor are there any enforcement or oversight bodies tasked with managing implementation.
Specific exemptions to disclosure are outlined in the aforementioned FOI law, the Criminal Code (2005), and the Act on Processing of Personal Data No. 429 (2000). No public interest test exists whereby exemptions to disclosure may be overridden in cases where disclosure of information benefits the public interest.
Appeals may be filed with public authorities and with the courts. There is no appeals process through an independent non-judicial mechanism, such as an information commissioner. The Ombudsman’s decisions are non-binding.
There are no sanctions specified in the law for violations of FOI provisions, nor are there any enforcement or oversight bodies tasked with managing implementation.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scope and Coverage | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 87 | 93 | |
| Information access and release | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 88 | 71 | |
| Exceptions and Overrides | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | |
| Sanctions for non-compliance | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Monitoring and Oversight | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 0 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Legislation
Public Procurement
The Danish public procurement system is regulated by the Danish Public Procurement Act. The public procurement body is the Competition and Consumer Authority, which is an organization under the Business and Growth Ministry.
The lowest minimum thresholds for conducting a public procurement tender are:
▪ DKK 500,000 for goods (EUR 70,000)
▪ DKK 300,000 for works (EUR 40,000)
▪ DKK 500,000 for services (EUR 70,000)
The minimum number of bidders is 3 for open procedures, restricted procedures and negotiated procedures and there is no minimum in case of framework agreements. The minimum submission period is 35 days for open procedures, 30 days restricted procedures and 30 days negotiated procedures from dispatch date. The final beneficial owners do not have to be disclosed when placing a bid.
There is no explicit preferential treatment, but contracting authorities can choose the most environmentally sustainable offer according to award criteria and take SME into consideration. There are a few cases for bid exclusion: in case of possible inability to carry out the project with satisfactory quality, in a responsive, responsible and timely manner, the provider can reject bidders. Bids can be also excluded because of abnormally low bid prices. In the case of having MEAT (‘most economically advantageous tender’ criteria), only the best 3 or fewer bids are considered.
In the bid evaluation phase, there no is a separate conflict of interest regulation on the composition of the evaluation committee and no form of independence of the contracting authority is mandated for the evaluation committee.
There is a payable fee in case of an arbitration procedure of DKK 10,000- 20,000, depending on the size of the contract. Court decisions are publicly released online.
The lowest minimum thresholds for conducting a public procurement tender are:
▪ DKK 500,000 for goods (EUR 70,000)
▪ DKK 300,000 for works (EUR 40,000)
▪ DKK 500,000 for services (EUR 70,000)
The minimum number of bidders is 3 for open procedures, restricted procedures and negotiated procedures and there is no minimum in case of framework agreements. The minimum submission period is 35 days for open procedures, 30 days restricted procedures and 30 days negotiated procedures from dispatch date. The final beneficial owners do not have to be disclosed when placing a bid.
There is no explicit preferential treatment, but contracting authorities can choose the most environmentally sustainable offer according to award criteria and take SME into consideration. There are a few cases for bid exclusion: in case of possible inability to carry out the project with satisfactory quality, in a responsive, responsible and timely manner, the provider can reject bidders. Bids can be also excluded because of abnormally low bid prices. In the case of having MEAT (‘most economically advantageous tender’ criteria), only the best 3 or fewer bids are considered.
In the bid evaluation phase, there no is a separate conflict of interest regulation on the composition of the evaluation committee and no form of independence of the contracting authority is mandated for the evaluation committee.
There is a payable fee in case of an arbitration procedure of DKK 10,000- 20,000, depending on the size of the contract. Court decisions are publicly released online.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Scope | 58 | 55 | 65 | 71 | 48 | ||
| Information availability | 83 | 96 | 96 | 46 | 31 | ||
| Evaluation | 81 | 81 | 75 | 81 | 75 | ||
| Open competition | 89 | 83 | 67 | 50 | 75 | ||
| Institutional arrangements | 29 | 29 | 93 | 86 | 36 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Legislation
| Act on the Complaints Board for Public Procurement (Danish) | |
| Consolidation Act on the Danish Competition and Consumer Authority (Danish) | |
| Executive Order No. 1624/2015 on the Complaints Board for Public Procurement | missing file: |
| Executive Order No. 593/2016 implementing the Public Procurement Act (Danish) | |
| Executive Order on the Award of Certain Works, Supply and Service Contracts in the Fields of Defence and Security (Danish) | |
| Executive Order No. 892/2011 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors (Danish) | |
| Public Procurement Act 1564/2015 | missing file: |
Anti Money Laundering
Denmark's anti-money laundering framework is based on the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Criminal Code, the rules on beneficial ownership registration and the Circular on the Danish FIU. The AML Act provides for a coordination forum, set up by the Minister for Industry, Business and Financial Affairs, for authorities' risk assessments and general measures. However, no explicit provision was found requiring Denmark to prepare a national risk assessment or review it at least every four years.
The conversion or transfer of criminal proceeds to conceal or disguise their illicit origin is criminalised. Attempts and aiding or abetting are punishable, and aggravated money laundering carries up to eight years' imprisonment. The Criminal Code does not clearly cover the full indicator wording on concealment or disguise and on acquisition, possession or use, and no explicit provision states that a predicate-offence conviction is unnecessary or that all factual elements of the predicate offence need not be established.
Legal persons may be fined, but no explicit rules were found on liability arising from lack of supervision or on the broader non-financial sanctions. Breaches of the AML Act are sanctionable, but not clearly in the terms of the indicator for serious, repeated or systematic breaches. Supervisors may order necessary measures, but no clear general rule allows periodic penalty payments, and publication of all sanction and administrative-measure decisions is not clearly required.
Beneficial ownership information is registered centrally, with rules on updates, discrepancy reporting and legitimate-interest access. That said, no clear rule was identified requiring the register itself to verify submissions, and the register has no identified powers to request documents or carry out checks. Fines exist for failures and incorrect registrations, but no clear rule empowers the register itself to apply the full set of measures or sanctions required. Beneficial owners may learn which persons with a legitimate interest accessed their data, so non-identification of journalists and civil society organisations is not ensured. AML/CFT supervision is divided among designated authorities.
Denmark's FIU, the Money Laundering Secretariat within the National Special Crime Unit, is expressly operationally independent. It receives and analyses suspicious reports, disseminates information, has access to the information it needs and cooperates with other EU FIUs. For larger or especially suspicious transactions, obliged entities must refrain from carrying out the transaction until they have reported it and obtained the FIU's approval, and the FIU must arrange a decision on seizure by the end of the following banking day.
The conversion or transfer of criminal proceeds to conceal or disguise their illicit origin is criminalised. Attempts and aiding or abetting are punishable, and aggravated money laundering carries up to eight years' imprisonment. The Criminal Code does not clearly cover the full indicator wording on concealment or disguise and on acquisition, possession or use, and no explicit provision states that a predicate-offence conviction is unnecessary or that all factual elements of the predicate offence need not be established.
Legal persons may be fined, but no explicit rules were found on liability arising from lack of supervision or on the broader non-financial sanctions. Breaches of the AML Act are sanctionable, but not clearly in the terms of the indicator for serious, repeated or systematic breaches. Supervisors may order necessary measures, but no clear general rule allows periodic penalty payments, and publication of all sanction and administrative-measure decisions is not clearly required.
Beneficial ownership information is registered centrally, with rules on updates, discrepancy reporting and legitimate-interest access. That said, no clear rule was identified requiring the register itself to verify submissions, and the register has no identified powers to request documents or carry out checks. Fines exist for failures and incorrect registrations, but no clear rule empowers the register itself to apply the full set of measures or sanctions required. Beneficial owners may learn which persons with a legitimate interest accessed their data, so non-identification of journalists and civil society organisations is not ensured. AML/CFT supervision is divided among designated authorities.
Denmark's FIU, the Money Laundering Secretariat within the National Special Crime Unit, is expressly operationally independent. It receives and analyses suspicious reports, disseminates information, has access to the information it needs and cooperates with other EU FIUs. For larger or especially suspicious transactions, obliged entities must refrain from carrying out the transaction until they have reported it and obtained the FIU's approval, and the FIU must arrange a decision on seizure by the end of the following banking day.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Risk-based approach | 33 | ||||||
| Sanctions for natural persons | 43 | ||||||
| Sanctions for legal persons | 25 | ||||||
| Pecuniary sanctions for obliged entities | 40 | ||||||
| Beneficial ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements | 52 | ||||||
| Supervision of obliged entities | 100 | ||||||
| Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) | 100 | ||||||
| Mutual legal assistance (MLA) and International Cooperation | 100 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness
Qualitative Data
Legislation
Asset Recovery
Denmark’s asset recovery framework is primarily governed by the Criminal Code (Straffeloven) and the Administration of Justice Act (Retsplejeloven). The Asset Recovery Office within the National Police traces criminal proceeds and assists with seizure and confiscation. Courts and enforcement authorities oversee the management of seized and confiscated property.
The Administration of Justice Act permits court-ordered seizure to secure confiscation. Under Section 75 of the Criminal Code, proceeds and items used in, produced by or otherwise involved in offences may be confiscated. If proceeds cannot be recovered directly, an equivalent amount may be confiscated. Assets held by third parties may also be seized, and confiscation can extend beyond direct proceeds to other assets where a link to the offence is established. Confiscation generally accompanies criminal convictions; Denmark has no general non-conviction-based framework or separate unexplained-wealth confiscation regime. Danish legislation does not establish a specific national asset recovery strategy with updates at least every five years, as required by Directive (EU) 2024/1260, which sets a deadline of 24 May 2027.
International cooperation under the Administration of Justice Act and mutual assistance rules covers tracing, seizure and confiscation. The Asset Recovery Office exchanges information through CARIN and the EU ARO network under Council Decision 2007/845/JHA. Confiscated assets may be shared with foreign states under rules implementing the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141). No specific provision governs cost-sharing for freezing and confiscation orders.
The Administration of Justice Act permits court-ordered seizure to secure confiscation. Under Section 75 of the Criminal Code, proceeds and items used in, produced by or otherwise involved in offences may be confiscated. If proceeds cannot be recovered directly, an equivalent amount may be confiscated. Assets held by third parties may also be seized, and confiscation can extend beyond direct proceeds to other assets where a link to the offence is established. Confiscation generally accompanies criminal convictions; Denmark has no general non-conviction-based framework or separate unexplained-wealth confiscation regime. Danish legislation does not establish a specific national asset recovery strategy with updates at least every five years, as required by Directive (EU) 2024/1260, which sets a deadline of 24 May 2027.
International cooperation under the Administration of Justice Act and mutual assistance rules covers tracing, seizure and confiscation. The Asset Recovery Office exchanges information through CARIN and the EU ARO network under Council Decision 2007/845/JHA. Confiscated assets may be shared with foreign states under rules implementing the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (ETS No. 141). No specific provision governs cost-sharing for freezing and confiscation orders.
Quantitative Data
Primary Metric | 2012 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2020 | 2024 | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asset Offices | 100 | ||||||
| Confiscation | 56 | ||||||
| International cooperation | 100 |
Values lie in range between 0 and 100, higher values implying higher legislation comprehensiveness